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Introduction1
The budget speech is, in essence, a linguistic and rhetorical exposition of the logic
and rationale for the particular means and objectives underpinning the annual
business of getting and spending. Along with the Queen’s Speech it is, with its own
protocols and traditions, one of the monumental set pieces of the parliamentary
year. And as one commentator has put it with respect to an analysis of Australian
budget speeches: ‘rather than simply a vehicle for new announcements, the budget
speech has a rhetorical function. It affords a significant opportunity for a
government to argue for its economic policy [and] vision’ (Lukin, 2015, p. 1).
As Fairclough has stated ‘much of the action of government is language’ and
budget speeches are certainly one of the most telling examples of this (Fairclough,
2000, p. 157). At one level they are, of course, a means of communicating with
what have been termed particular ‘discourse communities’: for example, the
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members of the House of Commons to whom they are most immediately addressed
but also those beyond the Palace of Westminster – ad urbe et orbe – the City and
the global financial community, which have their ‘own particular [discursive]
genres, [their] own set of specialised terminology and vocabulary, and a high
level of expertise in [their] particular area’ (Paltridge, 2006, p. 12). But, as a
discursive and communicative exercise, these speeches are more than this. For
when the Chancellor speaks, it is to communicate with a constituency that
transcends these specialist and particular discourse communities, namely the
British public;2 recognising as Chancellors do that budget rhetoric and measures,
both of a micro and a macro character, can have a significant impact on that
constituency’s political perceptions and material interests and thence the outcome
of General Elections.3
In terms of Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis,
which posits an analysis of texts, discourse practice (text production, distribution
and consumption) and discursive events as instances of socio-cultural practice, we
can see budget speeches, as both written and spoken texts, as having a distinctive
forms of production, distribution and consumption and as a cathartic moment in a
particular kind of socio-cultural theatre. As to text production this may originate in
the bowels of the Treasury, but as a function of manifesto commitments balanced
with existentially dictated financial and economic imperatives. Dissemination is
essentially through the mass and financial media but is also mediated by subsequent
political speeches both inside and outside the palace of Westminster. As to socio-
cultural practice, the Budget has its own rituals from the waving of the red box on
the steps of No. 11, to the protocols that dictate and choreograph its performance in
the House of Commons.
However, as far as this study is concerned the focus will be limited to the first of
these dimensions, namely the budget speech as spoken and written text and,
specifically, its construction of an ideal citizenry in the particular circumstances of
war, economic crisis and economic recovery. In this regard, the article considers
the discursive/rhetorical manner in which this was done, the socio-political
purposes which this imaginative act served and how these changed over the course
of the twentieth century.
As critical discourse theorists remind us, language connects with, mediates,
expresses and constitutes social relations of power and domination (Fairclough,
2000, pp. 158–159). Van Dijk, for example (2001, p. 357), mirroring the reflections
of the rhetorical theorists of ancient history, has written of the power that derives
from those who can convince their audience of the authoritative, trustworthy, or
credible sources which underpin their discourse. And budget speeches in particular
both demand and evidence this quality. While their messages are often simple, the
language in which they are delivered can be arcane. And it is that inaccessibility,
except to a financial elite, that often gives them their particular authority. However,
if they are to resonate as authoritative, trustworthy and credible, they must also
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engage with those who do not make up the financial cognoscenti. And here the
peroration of the budget speech furnishes just such an opportunity; the language of
the collective, however conceptualised, providing a potentially potent means of
doing so.
Political rhetoric is also integral not just to the articulation but also the formation
of ideology. As Finlayson has put it:
ideological thought and expression are never simply a ‘working out’ of a
series of concepts or propositions but a dynamic interaction of predispositions
with both opponents and events, mediated by political actors who must make
choices about how to understand and persuasively present a case they must
perform. The classical name for this activity is rhetoric (Finlayson, 2012,
p. 758, my emphasis).
Budget speeches must therefore be seen in this light: not just as a means of
transmitting a set of technical information about the nation’s finances but as a
rhetorical construction of the world and the concepts in terms of which it wishes its
audience to understand it. Therein lies their persuasive power, or lack of it.
As to the peroration of a speech, this has been variously defined. In neutral terms,
it is simply the concluding part of an oration and, in classical rhetoric, it
represented the last of the six traditional components in the speech’s disposition.
Again, from the perspective of classical authors, the peroration had a number of
purposes.4 Primarily it represented a recapitulation of the arguments that had been
deployed in the speech but was also deemed to be that part which aimed to engage
with the emotions of the audience. So, for Cicero:
the entire speech should be concluded most often by amplifying our points,
either by kindling the emotions of the jurors or by soothing them. Everything,
both in the preceding sections of the speech and particularly in the last,
should be aimed at stirring the jurors’ emotions as much as possible and in
prompting them to think what is to our advantage (Cicero, 2001, p. 14).5
For Aristotle too, the epilogos had the purpose of ‘moving the hearer into
emotional reaction… pity and indignation and anger and hatred and envy and
emulation and strife’ and also casting those who might disagree in a negative light,
while getting the listener to take a favourable view of the orator.6 Similarly, the
Roman writer Quintilian stressed the importance of arousing the passions of the
audience,7 and again noted two components of the peroratio: the one involving a
recapitulation of the heads of the speech the other directed to exciting the feelings
of the listeners:8 for ‘appeals to emotion are necessary if there are no other means
for securing the victory of truth, justice and the public interest’ (Quintilian, 1921,
Vol. 2, p. 387). Or, as a later eighteenth-century commentator exhorted: ‘let your
perorations … often be lively expostulations with the conscience of the hearer’
(Mather, 2015, p. 106).
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In this context, if a speech is to be effective it must resonate with that
audience’s sensibilities and sense of themselves. Of course this wider audience
may read the speech, or have it communicated to them in full or in part by the
press or other media, but they are not present for the performance which the
peroration represents. Nevertheless, if its impact on the immediate parliamentary
audience is important, that on the wider one is politically critical, and therefore its
capacity, as classical writers argued, to evoke an empathetic emotional response.
And while there are different ways of doing so, this article focuses specifically on
how this challenge was met by the rhetorical construction and representation of
an ideal citizenry, a rhetorically fashioned mirror that showed its extra-
parliamentary audience to itself in a manner that secured their support for, and
practical delivery of, the measures being proposed. More specifically here the
paper will examine how Chancellors, in their perorations, have delineated the
virtues and qualities which an ideal citizenry should possess; how, in doing so,
they have burnished its self-image, flattering not so much to deceive as to
persuade; how they have constructed a moral identity for the nation and
manufactured a corresponding notion of collective moral purpose and, critically,
how they have imbricated this citizenry’s moral qualities with the measures being
proposed, thereby investing it with responsibility for their success. As we shall
see, in the true spirit of perorations, this was an ideal that consistently sought to
construct a self-image that allowed it to engender and exploit its audience’s
emotional reflexes, rhetorically sculpting and humouring its aspirations and
inflating its self-regard and capacities. Standing Robert Burns on his head, the
audience was encouraged to see themselves not as others saw them, but as they
would most like to see themselves.9
As to the collective concepts which mediated the construction of this citizenry,
the paper has focused primarily on the use of ‘country’, ‘nation’, ‘people’ and
‘community’. Others have been touched upon, such as ‘race,’ but this was used
only twice in these perorations. ‘Land’ and ‘Shores’, though superficially
topographical references, were clearly used for their powerful ‘collective’
connotations and these have also been noted. However, they tend to be collocated
with the chosen concepts and therefore are effectively considered alongside these.
Finally, while recognising its inherent connotational ambiguities, the use of the first
person plural in the rhetorical construction of an ideal citizenry has also been
considered.
It is appreciated that the collective concepts primarily examined – ‘commu-
nity’, ‘nation’, ‘country’ and ‘people’ – each carry a distinctive historical and
connotative baggage and resonance; each, therefore, has particular rhetorical
possibilities that can be used to shape or construct the ideal. However, in terms of
the construction of an ideal citizenry they were each unpacked in remarkably
similar ways, with the rhetorical choreography most often taking the form of an
attribution of laudatory behavioural characteristics, virtues or practical
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competencies. Further, while note is taken of some of the changes in the
frequency of perorational usage of these key concepts over the course of the
century (see below Tables 1, 2), the size of the corpus does not allow any firm
conclusions to be derived from this. Nevertheless the issue of frequency is
discussed in the Conclusion and, in particular, in notes 34 and 36.
In terms of historical context, the paper focuses primarily on speeches in times of
war, impending conflict and economic crisis. However, those delivered in the post-
war period of increasing affluence have also been considered, as they reveal a
different concept of the ideal citizenry, one that saw it as a fundamental driver of
economic progress and prosperity, a concept not apparent earlier in the century.
And with this went, as we shall see, a different and differently constructed set of
virtues, attributes and capacities.
There remains then the issue of identifying what constitutes the peroration. In
some of the later budget speeches this is ‘solved’ by the actual insertion of
‘Peroration’ or ‘Conclusion’ in the printed text. However, for most of the speeches
this is not the case, and establishing the peroration’s onset becomes a matter of
literary judgement, though one that can be informed both by the characteristics
identified in classical literature and also by what applied linguists would term
certain ‘discourse markers’. And, using these, the judgement is usually relatively
easy to make, with a clear shift in discursive tone, tempo and rhetorical content
signalling the finale.10
There is now, of course, a considerable literature on rhetoric and British politics,
political theory, political psychology and ideology (see, e.g., Aletta, 2000;
Fairclough, 2000; McLean, 2001; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Atkins, 2011). And,
more specifically and more recently, there have also been a number of studies of the
Table 1: Number of uses of collective concepts
Country Nation National People Community
1900–09 12 2 0 6 3
1910–19 10 4 0 2 2
1920–29 7 4 3 3 1
1930–39 19 8 5 8 4
1940–49 5 3 2 13 3
Sub-total 53 21 10 32 13
1950–59 2 1 1 9 1
1960–69 4 1 2 6 1
1970–79 3 7 3 19 1
1980–89 2 3 0 2 0
1990–99 7 0 0 6 1
Sub-total 18 12 6 42 4
Total 71 33 16 74 17
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language of budget speeches (see Lukin, 2015; Thompson, 2015). But such
literature is still relatively thin and it is to this that the article seeks to make a
contribution.
War
The1900 budget peroration of Michael Hicks Beach11 was a particularly splendid
rallying cry in time of conflict; on this occasion, the Boer War, its tone, substance
and understanding of past and present predicaments crafted to render palatable the
fiscal hit necessary to pay for the hostilities. But more than that it constructed a
citizenry that aligned itself with the necessary financial sacrifices. Here the specific
rhetorical means, with a powerful emotive resonance, was to juxtapose these
sacrifices with those being made by British troops. So:
our soldiers in the field, from whatever part of the Empire they have come,
have shown that they are equal to their forefathers. Our great colonies,
though perhaps at first sight not so directly interested in this war as ourselves,
have eagerly taxed themselves in men and money for the cause of the Empire.
Table 2: Frequency of use by the Chancellors of different political parties
Country Nation National People Community
Liberals
1906–14 13 4 0 3 1
Per words 175 570 – 760 2279
Conservatives
1900–05 7 2 – 4 2
1925–29 4 1 3 2 1
1932–39 14 5 4 5 1
1952–63 2 1 1 4 2
1970–73 1 5 1 8 0
1979–96 7 3 0 6 1
Sub-total 35 17 9 29 7
Per words 326 690 1304 404 1677
Labour
1930–31 5 3 1 3 3
1945–51 6 3 2 15 2
1965–70 2 1 2 10 0
1974–78 1 2 2 8 1
1997–1999 2 0 0 5 0
Sub-total 16 9 7 41 6
Per words 471 889 1143 191 1334
Liberals Corpus: 2279; Conservatives: 11, 738; Labour: 8002.
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Success in the War was therefore linked to past glories and the present Empire,
both the contribution that the latter had voluntarily made in terms of men and
materials but also the consequences for Empire of its outcome. It was not just
Britain but the British Empire that was engaged in the war; the cause for which
sacrifices should be made was ‘the cause of the Empire’, ‘our’ Empire, ‘our great
colonies’, not just that of the nation.
But it is the authority of the nation and the people which was subsequently
invoked as a compelling argument in favour of the fiscal measures proposed. For
while:
opinions on these subjects may differ… there is one thing on which the great
majority of this nation has made up its mind, and that is that, at whatever cost,
this war shall be prosecuted to a successful termination. To-day we ask you to
provide means to fulfil that mandate of the people.
For ‘foreign nations are watching us, sometimes, I fear, with no friendly eye, to
see whether years of comfort, of peace, of increasing wealth, have softened the
fibre or diminished the courage and the tenacity of purpose of our race’ (Hansard,
1900, col. 78, my emphasis). For Hicks Beach, Britain must be a Sparta not an
Athens, and ‘this nation’, ‘the people’, ‘our race’, through the mandate they had
given and the qualities which thereby characterised them, had made clear their
resolve to be just that and defend Britain’s pre-eminent global position. The
rhetorical invocation of the people and the nation, their political and moral resolve,
their appreciation of historical imperatives and their imperial responsibilities and
the mandate they had given the government were therefore used to claim a
prescriptive authority for what the Chancellor was seeking to deliver. It was they
who, in the final analysis, willed the fiscal measures required for the successful
prosecution of the war. The mandate for the sacrifices which the people must bear
came from the people themselves, a citizenry that had not lost its ‘fibre’, its
‘courage’ and its ‘tenacity of purpose’.
And it was this moral capacity of ‘the people’ to make such sacrifices in time of
war which was again invoked in 1915 when, for the Chancellor Reginald
McKenna, ‘our greatest resource’ was ‘the continued willingness of the whole
people to pay their share’ (Hansard, 1915, col. 363, my emphasis);12 McKenna
here linking the willingness to pay with the people’s sense of equity. And once
more, in 1918, Bonar Law expressed himself ‘perfectly certain that the country as a
whole will bear this heavy additional burden [proposed in the budget] in the same
spirit in which they have submitted to sacrifices far more heavy than anything
measured by mere money value’ (Hansard, 1918, col. 720, my emphasis).13 The
truly telling phrase, and that most likely to resonate with his parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary audience, was of course the final one. Whatever pecuniary
sacrifices had been undergone, whatever material deprivations had been necessi-
tated, however austere the fiscal regime had been during the course of the Great
Thompson
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War, this weighed as nothing in the balance compared to the other and more telling
sacrifices that that war had necessitated. A ‘country’ that had embraced such
sacrifices, and shown the capacity to bear them, would not bridle at the fiscal
measures which the war necessitated and the Chancellor was proposing.14
And similarly, during the course of the Second World War, it was comparable
virtues of the citizenry that were invoked as both the progenitors and the guarantors
of the abstinence which the war demanded. In this regard, John Simon, in 1940, as
with Hicks Beach, directly linked the military struggle with what was necessary
from the populace to pursue the conflict to a successful conclusion. So:
provided that the zeal and persistence of our people in supporting
Government loans equals the fortitude and resolution of our people in
paying Government taxes, we have nothing to fear; and our financial front
will hold as firmly as does every other front in the fight for victory and
freedom (Hansard, 1940, col. 88, my emphasis).15
Although fortunately, in 1940, the financial front held more firmly than that in
France and Belgium. It is thus that the citizenry was presented to itself and the
moral pressure of self-image applied. ‘Zeal and persistence’, ‘fortitude and
resolution’: these were the qualities needed to bear the sacrifices required for
victory on both the financial and military fronts.
Again, in 1943, Kingsley Wood16 linked the financial sacrifices of the ‘people’
and ‘the country’ to the successful pursuit of the armed struggle. His budget, he
knew, represented:
a very great degree of sacrifice by all members of the community, but it is
worth making, for it enables us to keep our financial and economic life in that
sound and healthy condition which has already, as I believe, been such a
powerful aid to the war effort and will help us so much after the war … I do
not doubt that they will be willingly accepted by our people, who have played
so great a part in the financial field. They once again represent our
determination to see that nothing we can do is left undone to achieve early
victory and that we go forward unceasingly and unflinchingly until the issue
is decided by the triumph of the right and a free and decent world is assured
for all mankind (Hansard, 1943, col. 974, my emphasis).
The language is inclusive and the use of ‘community’ is particularly evocative
here as is its link to the notion of fairness and equity in sacrifices associated with
the idea of community membership. Further, the use of ‘our people’ and the first
person plural are significant discursive markers that identified the citizenry with the
government and what it was seeking to achieve. And so we have the construction of
a citizenry ‘unflinchingly’ and ‘unceasingly’ pursuing a collective ‘war effort’
aimed at the ‘triumph of the right and a free and decent world’, while embracing
the fairness of equitable sacrifices which it entailed. Once again there was also the
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discursive linking of the Home Front with the war front, the ‘community’ and
‘people’ with the armed forces, while at the same time associating them with an
ethical endeavour of global significance.
Chancellors of all parties similarly deployed such rhetorical devices to justify an
increase in defence expenditure when conflict loomed, or seemed to loom, or was
made to seem to loom, on the horizon. Thus, as rearmament gathered momentum
prior to the Second World War, it was once again the language of collective
restraint and sacrifice that informed the perorations of Chancellors. So we have
Neville Chamberlain17 asking for ‘new sacrifices’ from ‘the country’. That such
exactions were necessary was a ‘bitter disappointment to me’, but:
no man hesitates to set his fire-fighting appliances in readiness when already
he can feel the heat of the flames on his face. Our safety is more to us than
our comfort, and I think the country which has applauded and approved the
precautions we are taking will not grudge us the means of bringing them
about in the shortest space of time that we can compass (Hansard, 1936, col.
58, my emphasis).
So, for Chamberlain, where security and comfort represented a zero-sum-game,
there could be no doubt that the ‘country’ would have the moral resolve to prioritise
the former over the latter, Sparta once again being preferred to Athens. Moreover,
this invocation of the moral authority of ‘the country’ or ‘the nation’ again
informed the argument that there must be a necessary link between what the people
had demanded and what was required to meet those demands. And noteworthy here
as well is the gendered nature of the citizenry’s construction.
In 1938 too, with John Simon now the Chancellor, the budget was designed
firstly: ‘for the financing of our multifarious social services which spread so much
benefit and help where it is needed; secondly, for the preservation of our financial
strength which is absolutely vital to our Defence if trouble comes; and, thirdly, for
the protection of our native land’. A spirit of national unity again being invoked in
linking social service provision, financial strength and national defence –
connecting the citizenry, the City and the armed forces.
Further, the increased expenditure on armaments and its fiscal consequences
were associated with, and in some measure rationalised in terms of, a parallel
policy of appeasement. So while it could be accepted that:
the mere piling up of ever-greater armaments, by itself and in itself, is not a
certain means of securing safety or ensuring peace… this necessary outlay on
rearmament is being accompanied by an active policy for promoting
reconciliation and good will with other nations – a policy which is already
beginning to show results. In pursuit of this double objective, the load which
we have to bear will, assuredly, be carried with the dogged determination and
dauntless courage of the British race (Hansard, 1938, col. 67, my emphasis).
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Pursuing peace must go in tandem with preparations for war, an ethically driven
policy of promoting reconciliation and goodwill on the international front must be
matched by a citizenry whose consistent virtues of ‘dauntless courage’ and ‘dogged
determination’ would allow it to embrace the sacrifices necessary to prepare for
possible conflict.
Yet it is interesting that Hugh Gaitskell,18 in his 1951 budget, on the cusp of an
age of affluence and the enticements it offered, painted a less sanguine portrait of
the citizenry. The historical context was that of the Korean War – ‘a setting
physically remote from this Parliament of ours, but spiritually… very close’ – and
a post-war Britain struggling to escape the travails of austerity. And in such a
context:
the popular urge to relax, the pressure for higher and higher living standards,
the absorption with domestic issues, are all powerful influences which
weaken the will to re-arm. And we must face it; the very process of
democratic government to some extent encourages all this – often, in the past,
with fatal or near fatal results. It has happened many times in history that
democracies have played, while dictatorships have prepared.
It was therefore ‘the government’s responsibility and our opportunity, all of us,
to see that this does not happen again’ (Hansard, 1951, col. 867, my emphasis). So
here we have juxtaposed an exhortation to virtue, a recognition of the siren call of
consumerism and a preoccupation with self, the danger of the popular erosion or
dissipation of those virtues required by a democratic citizenry for the survival of
their polis and the evocation of a recent but also a longer past to highlight the
consequences of such a sapping of the moral will. And interestingly it is the
‘government’s responsibility’, but only the citizenry’s ‘opportunity’, to prevent this
erosion of a collective capacity to make sacrifices for the common good. And the
‘we’ is a reference to the Government not the citizenry and the political imperatives
are ones that are therefore endogenous rather than exogenous to the political
process.
Despite the years of post-war austerity which the people had already endured,
and the consequent popular urge to succumb to the powerful appeal of consumerist
indulgence, Gaitskell argued that the budget, and the government’s responsibil-
ities, had to be seen in the geo-political context of a ‘clash and conflict between the
two great forces in the world today – between Soviet imperialism on the one side
and the Parliamentary democracies on the other. It is this clash and the particular
episode in it – Korea – which has imposed upon us here in Britain the need to turn
our industries to defence and to call up our young men from their jobs and their
homes’ (Ibid.). This was a clash which dictated that, pace the urge and inclinations
of the citizenry, despite the obvious electoral advantages of accommodating a
latent consumerism, the government should assume responsibility for a fiscal
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policy that prioritised national and international security over even laudable social
expenditure.
So here we have a warning to, not an ideal representation of, the citizenry; a
perorational caution, not an invocation of the citizenry’s prescriptive authority nor
a celebration of its virtues. And, as it transpired, such a concern with a citizenry
antipathetic to continued austerity was to be borne out by the result of the 1951
General Election.
Crises
With economic crises we find again the capacity for abstinence and sacrifice, and
their associated moral qualities used to construct an ideal citizenry. And here, by
way of illustration, we have the most rhetorically overblown peroration to be found
in twentieth-century budget speeches. The context was that of global economic
depression and mass unemployment and the budget the second of 1931,19 one
which split the second minority Labour Government by seeking a significant
reduction in public expenditure in the light of the nation’s rapidly deteriorating
financial position. The unfortunate Chancellor was Philip Snowden: his aim, to
persuade his Party and the country that the implementation of the May Committee
Report, 1931, recommending economies of c. £120 m (£66 m of which was to
come from a reduction in unemployment benefits) was in the national economic
interest:
I have finished what I described as my very unpleasant task. These proposals
are admittedly drastic and disagreeable. They are justified only by the
regrettable necessity urged upon us by the present financial position of the
nation, but I have received during the last few weeks the most amazing
evidence of the willingness of the nation, men and women of all classes, to
make their contribution to this effort … Old age pensioners… have returned
their pension books…War pensioners have offered to forgo their pensions for
the year… Children, even, have sent from their savings-boxes shillings and
half-crowns to help the nation in its need.
Here, it is the nation’s financial position which ‘urges’ action, but it is a virtuous
citizenry, though constructed with particular reference to the less well off – such as
pensioners and children – which responds. So ‘the House of Commons will, I believe,
accept these proposals, the country will accept them – [Interruption] – and in doing so
they will show to the world an example of the indomitable British spirit in the face of
difficulty’. Thus constructed, with its ‘indomitable spirit’, we have of course a
citizenry that becomes integral to, but also responsible for, the solution of the
‘country’s’ difficulties. By the same token a failure to endorse the financial strategy
proposed by Parliament would signal a questioning of the virtues attributed to it.
Thompson
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And then, with a final rhetorical fanfare Algernon Swinburne (though
interestingly not mentioned by name) is wheeled in to associate this citizenry
with some of Britain’s literary, and naval, heroes, thereby co-opting them too to the
national task of balancing the budget: ‘All our past proclaims our future:
Shakespeare’s voice and Nelson’s hand, Milton’s faith and Wordsworth’s trust in
this our chosen and chainless land. Bear us witness: come the world against her,
England yet shall stand’. A literary flourish that, amongst other interruptions,
prompted the Red Clydesider, David Kirkwood, to suggest an addition to this list:
‘What about Dick Turpin?’ (Hansard, 1931, cols. 311–312, my emphasis).
Although perhaps Robin Hood might have more ideologically appropriate.20 Yet
for all its overblown character we have once again the key discursive moral
markers of ‘faith’ and ‘trust’ and ‘freedom’ and ‘spirit’, though this is also a
decidedly chauvinistic rendering of the citizenry and its virtues, with its evocation
of national heroes, national resilience and a glorious, if essentially English, past.
But in passing here we might note, in relation more generally to the language of
nationalism, that while in this instance chauvinistic, the construction of an ideal
citizenry in the perorations of twentieth-century budget speeches is one which gives
a primary rhetorical place to a ‘people’ or ‘nation’ whose attributes are civic rather
than aggressive, moral rather than predatory. In effect the collectivities are used to
construct and engender a sense of inclusive civic nationalism, one viewed as a
resource, a legitimiser and agent: a resource (of virtues) that can be drawn on in
times of economic and political difficulty, a legitimiser of the fiscal strategy being
articulated, and an agent that can give effect to a government’s fiscal proposals.
Again, in 1932, with Britain still in the depths of depression, the primary fiscal
objective was economy, with Neville Chamberlain, now Chancellor, acknowledg-
ing what this might provoke in the populace, before launching into a peroration
which, if avoiding the Scylla of literary pretension, nonetheless threatened to
founder on the Charybdis of metaphorical cliche´. Thus he accepted that:
the whole country is crying out for relief from taxation, and many people
believe that that relief will carry us a long way on the road to prosperity. To
the people who have been cherishing expectations of anything of the kind the
announcement that no relief shall be given to them is bound to cause
disappointment, and at first perhaps even resentment.
But the prospect of such resentment was discounted, and the metaphor of roads
and a collective journeying sustained, as Chamberlain conjured up the prospect of a
prosperity for the people and the nation which, with the requisite effort, lay just
over the horizon. For:
everyone who has ever scaled a mountain knows how the peak which seems
so close as he approaches the base, vanishes from his sight the moment he
begins his ascent. Again and again, as he continues to mount, he thinks he
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sees the summit, only to find that there is another ridge behind. There comes a
moment when he turns a corner, when he beholds at last the goal of his
ambition before him, and with only a few steps more, he stands upon the final
crest.
And then the third person singular becomes the first person plural. The striving
and effort and resilience of the masculine individual are transposed to the ‘we’ of
the collective, in this instance ‘the nation’. Individual endeavour is transposed into
a common or collective endeavour.
So too we of this nation, though as yet prosperity is hidden from us, can feel
assured that, so long as our faces are turned upwards and our hearts are
strong, we are moving in the right direction. One day, perhaps almost before
we know it, we shall find ourselves upon our mountain top.
In this context, ‘hard work, strict economy, firm courage, unfailing patience’
were represented as the signal moral qualities of the British people, those necessary
‘if the summit was to be gained’. For:
nothing could be more harmful to the ultimate material recovery of this
country or to its present moral fibre than that we should indulge ourselves
with hopes, possibly ill-founded, certainly premature, which might tempt us
to relax the efforts which have already produced a wonderful revival of public
confidence (Hansard, 1932, cols. 1438–1439, my emphasis).
In this manner, the appeal to virtue is shifted from the personalised third person
singular to the first person plural: the ‘we’ of an ideal citizenry or ‘nation’, with a
discursive intimation of its latent character. And it is made clear too that any failure
to realise such virtues would represent a decay of moral fibre, a damaging departure
from the moral ideal necessary to attain the mountaintop of economic recovery.
It is true that, in an atypical rhetorical concession, Neville Chamberlain conceded
in his 1934 budget speech that ‘the British people no doubt have their faults. They
are slow to realise the danger and slower still to change their habits or their
methods, even when the necessity for a change stares them in the face’. But
nonetheless, ‘they have one supreme virtue which you will find in every cl ass of the
community. Let them once be convinced that the country is in danger, and there is
no sacrifice whether of comfort, money, health, or even life itself which they will
not make’ (Hansard, 1934, cols. 926–927, my emphasis). So despite the occasional
fault of inertia, we have a citizenry capable of the ‘supreme virtue’ of self-
abnegation, a willingness to sacrifice well-being and ‘even life’ and a cheerful
acceptance of privation in the face of crisis.
As noted above, political rhetoric is a dynamic interaction with the audience
being addressed. An ideal citizenry is constructed for a purpose, as a vehicle for
explicating and legitimising the measures contained in the budget speech,
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sanctioning them in terms of their economic expediency and moral defensibility but
legitimising them too by invoking the imperatives and authority of that citizenry
which thereby becomes a player, at least rhetorically, in the game of fiscal
management. While, therefore, the Chancellor apportions virtue, those virtues are
discursively deployed for his own political and prescriptive ends. One might also
add that the more pressing the crisis and the greater the challenge, the more
impressive become the virtues with which this ideal citizenry is credited.
As regards the austerity of the immediate post-war period and the challenges
this represented, the virtues of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ were again
delineated in such a way as to conceive the citizenry as an agent, not simply the
object, of the government’s fiscal strategy. So, for Stafford Cripps,21 in his 1948
budget:
no one would deny that we as a people are passing through a time of the
greatest economic difficulty; but I am convinced that we as a nation are
tackling our problems with a sense of realism and with a determination which
hold out the promise of a victorious solution of our problems.
Further, ‘we have called upon every section of the community to help in this all-
out struggle. I have tried, in the light of the review of our present economic
situation, to frame Budget proposals which will back up that effort of the nation by
Government action’ (Hansard, 1948, col. 78, my emphasis). With contextualising
recourse to the bellicose language of ‘struggle’ and victory, we have the nation
‘tackling’ and the nation ‘helping’ in the economic struggle, such efforts being
supported by the ‘we’ of the Labour government. In this discursive vein, the
government and the Chancellor’s budget become the enablers; they play an
ancillary role, but in the final analysis, as in war, it was the nation and the people
that must deliver. Again this rhetorical device directly associated the citizenry, as
ideally constructed, with the government’s fiscal strategy and responsibility for its
successful implementation. But Cripps takes this further by emphasising the need
to:
make plain, both to our own people and to that large part of the world which
is watching anxiously to see how we are meeting the challenge of our
difficulties, that we are building – it may be somewhat slowly and painfully –
strong and stable foundations for our reconstruction, by the ordered use of our
resources, by guarding the value of our currency, and by the way we are
determined to tackle our job – the way of free men, working together in a free
democracy for the good of our nation and of all the free peoples of the world
(ibid, my emphasis).
And here the final sub clause is critical. There were those who under the heading
of socialism were also embarked on the business of reconstruction. For ideological
and electoral reasons, it was necessary that Labour differentiated itself from them
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and, specifically, Soviet Russia. It was also necessary ‘as determined democrats’ to
‘counter those elements in our country that are attempting to mislead our people
and so bring about a breakdown of our economy to serve their own ends’. So the
rhetoric of ‘our people’ is used to identify them with the struggle to protect ‘our
country’ and ‘our economy’ from the enemy within.22 An ideal citizenry is
juxtaposed to its opposite, a subversive minority. And so in this peroration, the
‘nation’ and ‘the people’ were conceived not just as an active agent in the business
of reconstruction but as meeting that challenge as ‘free men’, in a ‘free democracy’,
of ‘free peoples’. The ideal citizenry, mediated discursively by ‘the nation’, ‘the
people’ and ‘the country’ was therefore collocated and imbricated with the
concepts of freedom and democracy in such a way as to become their guardian.
Once more, in relation to the language of nationalism, the nation is conceived of in
civic rather than predacious terms.
The proposals that I have put forward today are, I believe, one more proof
that we can, by democratic methods, cope with the most difficult economic
situations. The political, economic, and spiritual freedom of our people is of a
value beyond all price. We shall only preserve that freedom so long as we are
prepared, in critical times like the present, to subordinate our personal
interests to the greater good of our country as a whole (Hansard, 1948, cols.
78–79, my emphasis).
Restraint, sacrifice and austerity were linked to the preservation of the freedoms
for which the British people had already paid an enormous price and the
willingness of the citizenry to embrace them represented a preparedness to think in
terms of the national or collective good rather than that of narrow self-interest.
Freedom had been hard won; its retention would be equally so. And this is not just
an ‘economic’ but a ‘spiritual freedom of our people’, a collective freedom that
transcended the merely material. For Stafford Cripps, this provided the legitimation
for the policy of fiscal restraint which he was pursuing. And indeed this
prioritisation of the public over the private was, for him, what democratic socialism
was all about. Throughout, it is the ‘we’ and the ‘our’ of a government identified
with the virtues of its citizenry, a free citizenry, which is the rhetorical pivot around
which the peroration revolves.
In the mid-1960s, with economic difficulties mounting, and in particular balance
of payments problems escalating, and with an enforced devaluation just around the
corner, we have the Chancellor, James Callaghan,23 again identifying the people as
the critical agent in delivering key economic goals; ‘pin[ning]… his faith on the
willingness and understanding of the British people to make the policy of
productivity, prices and incomes succeed and so secure our Triple Objective’
(Hansard, 1966, col. 1430).24 And in 1969 too, Roy Jenkins25 saw the efforts of the
nation as central to surmounting the economic problems confronting the
government. For ‘governments cannot and should not attempt to do everything.
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They cannot solve the balance of payments problem on their own. Only the nation
as a whole can do that’ (Hansard, 1969, col. 1042, my emphasis). Whether ‘the
nation’ or ‘the people’, the citizenry was rhetorically constructed as a key agent in
the resolution of the country’s difficulties. Indeed, the greater the difficulties, the
greater the role and responsibilities which Chancellors tended to settle upon it.
Viewed favourably this might be seen as a pragmatic recognition of the
increasingly circumscribed nature of the government’s economic power, some-
thing articulated by many economic commentators in the final third of the
twentieth century. Viewed less favourably, it might be seen as an abnegation of
responsibility, or a confession of prescriptive impotence bordering on the sin of
despair.
In times of turbulence, such as the 1970s, it was the authority and activism of the
citizenry that were once again invoked as attempts were made to arrest accelerating
inflation and to curb industrial unrest. This was particularly the case with the prices
and incomes policy pursued by the Heath government of 1970–1974. And here that
authority was rhetorically constructed to give popular sanction to legislation
required for its implementation. But ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ were also
counterposed to what was portrayed as the self-interestedly sectional interests of
the trade unions. So, in 1972, Tony Barber26 evinced the belief ‘that the British
people will now have no patience with any group whose actions endanger our
hopes for prices and employment’. And further, in 1973:
the Government have for the time being laid down, in the interests of the
nation as a whole, clear and definite limits on pay increases. In these
circumstances it is inconceivable that any Government could agree to a
dispute being settled by an offer outside the limits laid down.27 And it follows
that industrial action which sets out to achieve that will merely make the
nation poorer, and no one richer. As a people we can now show, for a
welcome change, that militancy does not pay, and that responsibility,
moderation and common sense will prevail.
‘The central objective’ of the budget was therefore ‘to maintain the economic
expansion which we have sought for so long, and which we are now at last
achieving’ but ‘to succeed we must all – Government and nation alike – be
steadfast in our resolve to control inflation. Only in this way can we give the British
people the opportunity to create a new wealth and a new strength for our country’
(Hansard, 1973, col. 280, my emphasis). So the interests, virtues and behaviour of
‘the nation’, ‘the people’, ‘the people as a whole’ and ‘the British people’ are seen
as critical to economic survival. The interests of the citizenry must trump, and were
used rhetorically to trump, the sectional interests of those self-interested groups
whose actions were portrayed as one of the primary causes of rapidly rising prices.
This citizenry is therefore invested with a transformative capacity, their interests,
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their endeavour and their restraint, distinguished from the meanness and rapacity of
self-seeking sectional interests.
As for Labour in this period, faced as it was with escalating inflation, rapidly
rising oil prices, growing industrial unrest, the miners’ strike and its legacy of the
3-day week, we have Denis Healey,28 in two separate budget speeches, expatiating
on the people’s predicament and resorting once again to a discourse of sacrifice and
stoicism couched in terms of national survival. So:
in one way or another my Budget calls on the majority of the British people to
make some sacrifice for the survival of their way of life. Few, I am confident,
will reject that call. We in Britain have always taken pride in our ability to
face reality when we are told the truth. Britain today is face to face with a
crisis which is no less challenging because it has come on us slowly – almost
imperceptibly – over the years. A fundamental change of course is long
overdue. I believe that the action which the Government have taken in the
past few weeks can mark the turning point in our people’s post-war history. A
new spirit of confidence and co-operation is already abroad. I ask the House
to accept the proposals in this Budget as a further step along the road to
realism and a united nation’.
So here too we have the common themes: the language of sacrifice coupled with
additions to the ideal citizenry’s canon of virtues – its ‘ability to face reality’, its
‘spirit of confidence and co-operation’. And while the Chancellor’s budget would
help to set the nation on ‘the road to realism’, it was the people’s sacrifice that was
vital, it was they who must traverse that road of financial realism and it was their
history – their past and their future – which was at issue. And, as in times of war,
Healey played the rhetorical card of national unity. Indeed a unified citizenry was
identified as a key strategic aim of the budget measures, the implication being that
4 years of Conservative government, leading as it had done to the catastrophe of the
miners’ strike and escalating social division, had done the opposite.
And as the economic situation worsened and what was to become the great IMF
crisis of 1976 loomed on the horizon,29 the onus was again placed on the ‘British
people’ and ‘the British people as a whole’ to extricate the nation from the
economic exigencies that it confronted. Here the metaphor of the journey is once
more the rhetorical vehicle. So, for Healey, there was:
a better alternative to the stony road we have to follow at present. It requires
only a sustained act of will to take it – an act of will from which no section of
the community, on the shop floor, in the board room or in the home, can stand
aside. If this Budget helps to convince the British people of this fact, it will
have performed a long-term service to our nation even more important than
the solution of the problems which are its immediate aim (Hansard, 1975,
cols. 321–322, my emphasis).
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And, consistent with this, there went a strong warning, in a later budget, as to the
profound limitations of fiscal policy. Thus:
there are severe limits to what any British Government can do by budgetary
measures to meet the objectives I have set. The main responsibility must fall
in this, as in all else, on the British people as a whole, and in particular on
those who work in industry. I have set out the problems which we must
overcome if we are to reach our goal. I have explained how we can overcome
them. I believe the British people have proved over the last 12 months that
they are capable of facing the facts (Hansard, 1976, col. 282, my emphasis).
So the moral qualities of ‘the British people’ were explicitly extended, or
transmuted, to encompass a responsibility and a reasoned capacity for both
engaging with and solving the macroeconomic problems which the nation
confronted. As rhetorically constructed here, the ideal citizenry becomes the
pivotal player in the unfolding economic drama of the 1970s.
In line with the seeming demise of the Phillips Curve, and an attendant loss of
confidence in government-directed, Keynesian demand management as a means of
trading inflation off against unemployment, the limits of fiscal policy were being
admitted by both Labour and the Conservatives. And in this regard, it is significant
that this peroration is from the 1976 budget, the year which saw a major crisis over
IMF funding and the year which some commentators have seen as tolling the death
knell of Keynesian social democracy.30 And here such sentiments as to the limits of
fiscal policy, and the consequent responsibilities of the British people, chimed with
James Callaghan’s famous Labour Party Conference Speech at Blackpool in 1976:
‘the post-war world we were told would go on forever, where full employment
could be guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor’s pen … We used to think that
you could just spend your way out of recession… I tell you in all candour that that
option no longer exists’ (Callaghan, 1987, pp. 425–426). But the prescriptive
impotence of government was rendered in these budget speeches in terms of the
ideal citizenry’s opportunity and responsibility.
Economic progress
At c.24,000 words the corpus of perorations is relatively small and so one must be
wary of any general observations about rhetorical trends over the course of the
century. Nevertheless, in the perorations of the budget speeches of the Thatcher
years in particular, we find an increasing emphasis on the state’s role as an enabler,
with the ‘nation’ and the ‘people’, the citizenry, constructed as the real drivers of
the British economy. Further, in these speeches, as the faith of politicians and
theorists in Keynesian macroeconomic management declined, there was an
increasing emphasis on the individual – individual effort, individual endeavour,
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individual initiative, individual virtue – as the critical agent in the delivery of
economic progress. The budget therefore comes to be conceived as an enabler
rather than a driver of the nation’s economic fortunes; putatively establishing the
macroeconomic ambience which would ensure that economic actors behaved in a
growth-generating the way.31 So, in 1971, the:
budget alone will not solve all our economic problems; but it does herald a
new approach, an approach based on the belief that lower taxation and
simpler taxation will, over the years ahead, help to create a new spirit – a new
spirit of personal endeavour and achievement, which alone can provide our
nation with growing prosperity (Hansard, 1971a, col. 1398, my emphasis).
Similarly, Tony Barber’s 1973 Budget was designed to ‘give the British people
the opportunity to create a new wealth and a new strength for our country’
(Hansard, 1973, col. 280, my emphasis). It was the British people, or at least
those employed in the private sector, and not the government, who were the real
creators of wealth. It was the private not the public sector which drove the
economy. It was the active citizen with initiative and endeavour who made for
economic progress. And it was therefore the responsibility of the Chancellor to
create the conditions that enabled such an imagined citizenry to flourish and
engender the prosperity and full employment that Keynesian demand manage-
ment had signally failed to achieve. The inherent British virtues of creativity,
entrepreneurialism and personal endeavour must therefore be fostered and given
the freedom to deliver what was beyond the power of Chancellors and budgets to
effect. So the British nation and the British people were less often constructed as
entities by reference to which Chancellors could claim an imprimatur for the kind
of interventionism which post-war governments in particular had regarded as
integral to the conduct of the nation’s economic affairs. Rather they became, or
more precisely the individuals composing them became, the essential drivers of
its economic progress.
And this message was spelt out with particular clarity by Geoffery Howe32 in
1979 in the first budget of the Thatcherite period: ‘I have stressed’, he stated, ‘the
urgent need for new policies to reverse the decline of the British economy. These
policies start with our conviction that it is people and not Governments who create
prosperity’. And in line with this the:
Budget seeks to reduce the role of Government. Government will spend less,
Government will borrow less. The Budget is designed to give the British
people a greater opportunity than they have had for years to win a higher
standard of living – for their country and for their families as well as for
themselves. I dare to believe they will respond to the opportunity that I have
offered them today (Hansard, 1979, col. 263, my emphasis).
Thompson
108  2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1746-918X British Politics Vol. 12, 1, 90–114
Further, following on from this, the citizenry’s virtues assumed a more
individualistic or self-regarding form, an inevitable corollary of the mantra that
there was no such thing as society. Specifically, these were the attributes or virtues
of ‘enterprise and risk-taking’ (Hansard, 1981, col. 782), ‘hard work’ (Clarke,
1996) and ‘ambition’ (1998);33 qualities associated more with getting on, material
acquisition and possessive individualism and less with collective endeavour and
achievement, with the 1995 Budget claiming in this context to ‘put Britain on
course to be the enterprise centre of Europe’ (Clarke, 1995, my emphasis).
Moreover, with the ideal citizenry and its virtues coming to be conceived more in
individualistic than collective terms, the frequency of usage of collectivist concepts
would seem to have diminished (see Tables 1 and 2). For example, ‘community’
was used seventeen times in the peroration of twentieth-century budget speeches.
Of those only one occurred after 1975 and then it was a technical reference to the
‘community charge’ in the budget speech of 1991. ‘Social’ and ‘socially’ were used
thirty-one times but only four times after 1970, two of those in the November
budget speech of 1974 where, in a crisis situation, Denis Healey invoked the value
of ‘social justice’ and made reference to the ‘social consequences’ of an aggressive
deflationary strategy. Further, if we take a very crude divide at half-century and
compare the period 1900–1949 with 1950–2000 then ‘country’ and ‘nation’ are
used less frequently in the latter than the former.34
Of course in the late-twentieth century the rhetoric of ‘the people’, ‘the country’
and ‘the nation’ was still used; indeed the usage of the first of these was a salient
feature of the more general political rhetoric of New Labour.35 But in the last two
decades of the twentieth century it tended to be invested with qualities that were
often less ethical and certainly less collective in nature. And, given this, it can be
argued that these concepts became rhetorical vehicles that were less frequently
used in the construction of an ideal citizenry.36 In this respect that citizenry and its
virtues came to be conceptualised in a distinctively more individualistic way; one
minor discursive symptom, perhaps, of a more general crisis of collective or
national identity that has surfaced in recent years.
Conclusion
In classical rhetorical theory, the peroration is the summative and performative part
of the speech. It is here, therefore, that one would expect examples of performative
or figurative language: language appealing to emotion as well as reason; language
that might be seen as flattering to deceive, and which must therefore engage with its
audience in a manner that both resonated with its self-image, while at the same time
shaping and constructing it. In this regard, the perorations of twentieth-century
Budget speeches conform to that model, emotively imagining and portraying the
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citizenry as it would wish to be seen, and as Chancellors believed it could be
persuaded to see itself.
This article has therefore sought to tease from these perorations some sense of
how collective concepts such as ‘the people’, ‘the country’, ‘the community’, ‘the
nation’ and others rhetorically mediated the construction of an ideal citizenry. In
terms of that construction, it has highlighted the qualities, virtues and attributes
with which that citizenry was imbued and how that construction was deployed to
legitimise budget proposals. Specifically, in times of difficulty and crisis, whether
of a military or an economic nature, this imagined entity was used as a rhetorical
vehicle to justify, exhort, legitimise, empathise, persuade, inspire and inculpate in
relation to the Budget’s financial strategy. In this regard, revenue raising measures
became a putative test and often a celebration of the citizenry’s will, steadfastness,
courage, tenacity, zeal, persistence, fortitude, determination, resolution and
willingness to confront the challenges which the Budget addressed.
And, through the delineation of this set of characteristics and virtues, these
perorations served to construct an affirmative and laudatory notion of what it was to
be British, one with which the populace would wish to identify and thereby
discursively imbricated it with what was being proposed. Moreover, Chancellors
also constructed this citizenry in a manner that elided its socially variegated
character. So we have references to ‘the whole nation’, ‘all members of the
community’, ‘all of us’, ‘all classes’, ‘all parties’, ‘all age groups’ and ‘all of us’,
to say nothing of the constant recourse to the first person plural. That said, and as
noted, the invocation of this moral collective or moral citizenry was less apparent in
budget speeches later in the century. Or perhaps more accurately, the citizenry was
rhetorically imagined in a different way. For then what came to the fore were its
individualistic characteristics and associated moral traits: a self-reliant, entrepre-
neurial and possessive individualism which it was the government’s responsibility
to encourage and incentivise, and which was represented as integral to success in an
increasingly competitive and turbulent economic world.
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identify anything which could legitimately be denominated a peroration at all.
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15 That said, in his pre-war period as Chancellor this notion of ‘the financial front’ as ‘the nation’s
fourth arm of defence in any future war’ led him to be ‘careful to limit expenditure on rearmament’,
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28 Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Wilson and Callaghan governments, 1974–1979: for a fuller
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privatisation of areas of the public sector. For a short account of the conduct of economic policy in
this period, see Smith (1987, pp. 86–104).
33 ‘The ambitions of the British people are once again the ambitions of the British Government. So this
is a Budget that by its measures, advances both enterprise and fairness. A Budget that has set new
ambitions for Britain’, Brown (1998, p. 1, my emphasis).
34 1900–1949, ‘Country’ is used 53 times or 1 per 248 words, as against 1950–2000, 18 times or 1 per
602 words; 1900–1949, ‘Nation’ is used 21 times or 1 per 626 words as against 1950–2000, 12 times
and 1 per 904 words. For a more detailed breakdown per decade and for the Chancellors of different
political parties see Tables 1 and 2.
35 See, for example, the discussion of New Labour’s use of the rhetoric of ‘national community’ and
‘one-nation politics’, Fairclough (2000, pp. 34–35).
36 As to frequency of usage, more generally, a number of tentative observations can be made (see
Tables 1, 2). First, the most popular collectivities by some considerable margin were ‘country’ and
‘people’, with ‘nation’, ‘national’ and in particular ‘community’ a long way behind. Second, the
usage of these collectivities, with the exception of ‘people’, was greater in the first than the second
half of the century and by some considerable margin. Further that exception is largely as a result of a
spike in usage in the troubled decade of the 1970s. Third, as regards particularly troubled decades,
the use of all collectivities was greater in the 1930s than any other in the first half of the century.
Given the fraught nature of these decades in economic and social terms, there is some evidence to
suggest that the frequency of their deployment was influenced by historical context. Fourth, as to
frequency of usage per 1000 words by Chancellors of different political persuasions, some indication
of this is given in Table 2. But again, because each case deals with a relatively small corpus, any
conclusions must be tentative. However, what this Table shows is that ‘country’ and ‘nation’ were
most frequently used by the Liberals (but with a corpus of only 2279 words). Perhaps more notably
‘people’ was most frequently used by the Labour Party and there is a considerable difference here
with the other political parties.
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